Helmspur's posture against ISO 27001, ISO 42001, SOC 2, GDPR, and AIUC-1.

In place — enforced by shipped code

• A.5 / A.8 — Identity & access. Sign-in and session state come from better-auth (src/lib/auth.ts, configured via src/lib/auth-config.ts); per-route gating uses requireAuth() from src/lib/require-auth.ts and requireAdmin() from src/lib/require-admin.ts.
• A.5.15 / A.8.5 — Secure authentication. The public procurement API at GET /api/brief/v1 (handler in src/app/api/brief/v1/route.ts) gates by a bearer API key. Keys are stored hashed: ApiKey.hash is scrypt-derived (N=2^15, r=8, p=1, keylen=64) with a per-row ApiKey.salt and a public-safe ApiKey.fingerprint (16-hex prefix of sha256 of the plaintext) — see prisma/schema/api-keys.prisma.
• A.5.30 — Audit logging for keys. ApiKeyAudit in prisma/schema/api-keys.prisma writes rows tagged action = 'generated' or 'rotated', carrying prefix (the public fingerprint) and createdAt — no plaintext, no salt, no hash ever logged.
• A.8.3 — Information access restriction. Every route under /api/projects/[projectId]/… reads projectId from the URL and scopes queries with where: { projectId } — schema in prisma/schema/projects.prisma with @@index([projectId]) on Revision, @@index([projectId, createdAt]) and @@index([projectId, status]) on Clash, plus onDelete: Cascade back to Project.
• A.8.15 / A.8.24 — Segregation. Contact-form and waitlist tables (prisma/schema/contact.prisma, prisma/schema/waitlist.prisma) are self-contained with no @relation to any other module's model. Mail is sent via src/lib/email/send.ts through Polsia's platform proxy — no postmark, sendgrid, resend, or nodemailer import, and no vendor API key in any env file.
• A.8.20 / A.8.22 — Transport & framing. proxy.ts emits per-request Content-Security-Policy built in src/lib/csp.ts, with upgrade-insecure-requests, frame-ancestors 'none', and a per-request script-src nonce with strict-dynamic. The IFC upload route is a same-origin multipart/form-data POST — no third-party upload URL.

Still pending — honest gaps

• A.5.9 — Inventory of information & associated assets. No formal asset register; project ownership is per-row (Project.ownerEmail) rather than a centralised register.
• A.6 — Risk treatment & Statement of Applicability. No SoA document; risk treatment is operational, not formally documented.
• A.5.25–A.5.30 — Incident management & continuity. No formal incident-response runbook or business-continuity plan beyond the FK-cascade deletion path.

In scope — what is shipped

• Single egress — no provider SDK in this repo. package.json carries no openai, @anthropic-ai/sdk, @google-cloud/aiplatform, or mistralaidependency. Any future AI call lives behind Polsia's platform proxy, which is the only egress that holds provider credentials.
• Server-only call sites. Planned AI surfaces land in src/app/api/ai/… route handlers, never in a client component. Browser code cannot reach the platform AI proxy directly.
• No third-party model provider key in .env. A grep over .env.example for OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or equivalent returns zero matches — credentials live with the platform proxy, not the customer repo.

Out of scope / pending — honest gaps

• AI impact assessment. No documented AI risk/impact assessment for the planned call sites.
• Data lineage. No formal trail of which uploaded-element fields can flow into an AI prompt; the upload payload contract is documented in prisma/schema/projects.prisma, but the AI-prompt-time boundary is not yet pinned.
• Human-oversight policy. No documented human-in-the-loop review step for AI-assisted outputs.
• Model-card registry. No centralised registry enumerating which model(s) the platform proxy routes to per capability.
• AI change-management. The PR-driven change-management loop is in place (general repo), but a model upgrade / down-switch procedure specific to AI surfaces is not yet written.
• AI-incident playbook. No documented incident-response procedure for an AI-specific failure mode (e.g. prompt-injection, jailbreak, model-degradation).

In scope — what is shipped

• EU/EEC processing region. All app data lives in the EU/EEC platform-default region, declared on /security/sub-processors and configured in polsia.toml under [env] DATABASE_URL = { source = "rdbms" }.
• Documented sub-processor list. Every third party with data access is enumerated on /security/sub-processors with data category and processing region per vendor — Polsia platform (EU/EEC); Stripe, Inc. via Polsia Connect (see Stripe's own list). Both rows last-reviewed 2026-08-23.
• Per-user data scoping. Every /api route that touches user-owned data is gated by requireAuth() (src/lib/require-auth.ts) for authenticated users and requireAdmin() (src/lib/require-admin.ts) for admin surfaces; queries carry where: { userId: user.id } sourced from the authenticated session.
• Per-project content scoping. Routes under /api/projects/[projectId]/… read projectId from the URL and scope reads and writes with where: { projectId }, and the schema marks Revision and Clash with @@index([projectId, ...]) for that exact predicate (schema: prisma/schema/projects.prisma).
• Purpose limitation. The waitlist and contact-form tables are self-contained: prisma/schema/contact.prisma and prisma/schema/waitlist.prisma carry no @relation to any other model — they exist solely to capture those forms and surface them in the same priority-leaning inbox.
• Right-to-deletion via cascade. Closing and deleting a project removes its revisions, clashes, and linked rows in one transaction — Revision and Clash carry onDelete: Cascade back to Project (prisma/schema/projects.prisma).
• Data-handling envelope. Documented on /security: storage columns enumerated, raw .ifc bytes deliberately not stored (parsed in memory and dropped per src/lib/ifc/parser.ts), transport encrypted, sessions stored server-side only.
• Intake path. The /security/contact page (ContactForm → POST /api/contact → ContactMessage table → founder email through src/lib/email/send.ts) logs each submission once in the same inbox, together with submitting address, company, project type, and message body.

Pending gaps — honest, no padding

• Article 30 record of processing. No formal record of processing activity lives in this repo — that artifact lives in compliance artifacts outside the app.
• Self-serve Data Subject Access Request (DSAR). No DSAR endpoint. A deletion request goes through /security/contact and is actioned by the engineering owner against the FK-cascade path described above.
• Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). No formal DPIA on the contact / waitlist intake path or on the /api/brief/v1 procurement-API path.
• International transfer mechanism — Stripe sub-region. No formal transfer-mechanism callout per Stripe sub-region; the region row on /security/sub-processors points to Stripe's own published list and is not re-asserted here.

In scope — framework alignment as shipped

• Single AI egress — no provider SDK in this repo. package.json carries no openai, @anthropic-ai/sdk, @google-cloud/aiplatform, or mistralai dependency. Any AI call site that lands in this repo goes through Polsia's platform proxy, which is the only egress that holds provider credentials.
• Server-only call sites. Planned AI surfaces live under src/app/api/ai/… route handlers, never in a client component. Browser code cannot reach the platform AI proxy directly.
• No third-party model provider key in env. .env.example carries no OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or equivalent — credentials stay on the proxy side, not in the customer repo.
• Same boundary as ISO 42001. The AIUC-1 read sits on top of the boundary already described in the ISO 42001 section above — one platform proxy, no provider SDK, no provider key in env.

Pending gaps — honest, no padding

• AI use-case risk / impact assessment. No documented assessment for the planned call sites.
• Data-lineage map. No formal line drawn from an uploaded IFC field to the AI-prompt boundary; the upload payload contract is documented in prisma/schema/projects.prisma, but the AI-prompt-time boundary is not yet pinned.
• Human-oversight step. No documented human-in-the-loop review step for AI-assisted outputs.
• Model-card registry. No centralised registry enumerating which model the platform proxy routes to per capability.
• AI-incident playbook. No documented runbook for AI-specific failure modes (prompt injection, jailbreak, model degradation).
• Model change-management. No formal model upgrade / down-switch procedure for the AI call sites.

ISO/IEC 27001

• Identity, sessions, admin grant: src/lib/auth.ts, src/lib/auth-config.ts, src/lib/require-auth.ts, src/lib/require-admin.ts
• Per-project scoping & cascade: prisma/schema/projects.prisma, src/app/api/projects/[projectId]/route.ts, src/app/api/projects/[projectId]/revisions/route.ts
• Transport & CSP: src/lib/csp.ts, proxy.ts
• Hashed API keys & rotation audit: prisma/schema/api-keys.prisma, src/app/api/brief/v1/route.ts, src/lib/brief/api-key-auth.ts
• Segregation of contact, waitlist, and email paths: prisma/schema/contact.prisma, prisma/schema/waitlist.prisma, src/app/api/contact/route.ts, src/app/api/waitlist/route.ts, src/lib/email/send.ts

ISO/IEC 42001

• No provider SDK — package.json contains no openai, @anthropic-ai/sdk, @google-cloud/aiplatform, or mistralai.
• Single egress lives on the platform proxy side; this repo's role is server-only call sites under src/app/api/ai/… when they exist.
• No provider key in env — .env.example carries no OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or equivalent variable.

SOC 2 — Common Criteria CC6–CC9

• CC6: src/lib/auth.ts, src/lib/require-auth.ts, src/lib/require-admin.ts, src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/
• CC7: src/app/api/projects/[projectId]/revisions/route.ts, src/lib/ifc/parser.ts
• CC8: polsia.toml + the general PR-driven repo workflow
• CC9: src/lib/csp.ts, proxy.ts, package.json, .env.example

GDPR — Regulation (EU) 2016/679

• Sub-processor list with data category + region: /security/sub-processors
• Storage envelope & raw-byte exclusion: src/lib/ifc/parser.ts, prisma/schema/projects.prisma, /security (storage section)
• Per-user / per-project session scoping: src/lib/require-auth.ts, src/lib/require-admin.ts, src/app/api/projects/[projectId]/route.ts
• Intake path (purpose-limited): prisma/schema/contact.prisma, prisma/schema/waitlist.prisma, src/app/api/contact/route.ts, src/app/api/waitlist/route.ts, src/lib/email/send.ts
• Deletion cascade & FK scoping: prisma/schema/projects.prisma (onDelete: Cascade on Revision / Clash), /security (retention section)

AIUC-1 — use-case framework alignment

• No provider SDK — package.json contains no openai, @anthropic-ai/sdk, @google-cloud/aiplatform, or mistralai
• Single egress on the platform-proxy side; this repo's role is server-only call sites under src/app/api/ai/… when they exist
• No provider key in env — .env.example carries no OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or equivalent variable
• AIUC-1 boundary is the same single-egress boundary that backs the ISO 42001 section above